Generales

By Carlos Olimpo Restrepo S., Journalist at UdeA Communications Office 

Over the past forty years, Colombian governments and armed groups have held repeated negotiations, allowing thousands to disengage from the conflict. Yet the violence endures, fueled by both familiar and newly restructured forces. This ongoing unrest keeps generating fresh attempts at dialogue. Experts now examine what kind of peace Colombia should build to finally stop the cycle of violence that began in the 1950s. 

Vera Grabe (right), representing the national government, and ELN delegate Pablo Beltrán at the conclusion of the sixth round of talks in the suspended negotiation process in February 2024. Photo: Government of Colombia Peace Delegation – Dialogues with the ELN. 
 
Since 1982, when President Belisario Betancur opened dialogue with guerrilla groups, Colombians have continued to debate how to negotiate an end to the armed conflict and what kind of peace the country should strive for. 

Since then, multiple negotiation processes between the government and insurgent groups have resulted in agreements. These groups include the April 19 Movement (M-19), the Revolutionary Workers’ Party (PRT), the Quintín Lame Indigenous Movement, the Socialist Renewal Current (CRS), the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP). 

Between 2003 and 2007, the government also reached agreements with paramilitary groups, notably the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), involving armed organizations with regional and national reach. 

Today, dialogue involves a range of armed actors, including guerrillas, dissidents from past peace processes, organized armed groups, and neo-paramilitary factions. This broadening of participants has raised new questions about the type of negotiation required and the model needed to end the cycle of violence that has plagued Colombia for over 60 years. Each form of violence carries unique characteristics shaped by historical context, political and territorial conditions, and social, economic, and international motivations. 

“In Colombia, multidimensional violence continues to persist, a complex issue we have struggled with for years. It includes political, social, and criminal violence driven by non-political actors. This makes it clear that a single approach cannot resolve the problem,” said Juan Correa Mejía, director of the Special Peace Unit at the Universidad de Antioquia. 

In response, Max Yuri Gil Ramírez, director of the Institute of Political Studies at UdeA, emphasized that, as the Truth Commission report highlighted, the repeated emergence of peace processes over the years has led to a situation where, while some groups reach agreements and engage in negotiations, others are left out. This exclusion allows individuals to demobilize, then return and reinforce remaining groups. 

In recent years, recidivism has become increasingly visible, as some former negotiators and combatants have returned to armed activity after demobilizing. Luciano Marín, known as Iván Márquez, exemplifies this trend. A FARC commander who signed the 2016 peace agreement, he later abandoned it in 2019 to form the Second Marquetalia. A similar case is that of Oliverio Isaza Gómez, alias Terror, who participated in the 2006 disarmament of the Magdalena Medio self-defense forces and later became a leader of the Clan del Golfo, remaining active until his death in February 2025. 

Elements to consider 

FARC’s demobilization and disarmament marked only the first step; the most serious challenges emerged during the process of putting the peace agreement into practice. Photo: UN Mission in Colombia.  
 
Gil Ramírez, a seasoned scholar of the armed conflict, stressed that peace goes beyond the mere disarmament or demobilization of armed groups. “Transformative strategies are necessary to improve the lives of people in affected areas and, in doing so, prevent the rise of new cycles of exclusion and violence,” he said. 

Juan Correa Mejía believes that resolving the country’s conflict requires more than just agreements between the state and armed groups, whether rebels or not. He argues that a “civic culture is needed, one that values life over societal differences and rejects violence to resolve conflicts. While conflict is inherent in society, nonviolent resolution mechanisms exist.” 

José Miguel Sánchez Giraldo, advisor to the national government delegation in the suspended talks with the National Liberation Army (ELN) and a former advisor in previous negotiations, emphasized, “We must approach the negotiating table with a clear commitment to peace because we cannot negotiate peace itself. We can agree on peace, but it isn’t limited to one moment. In Colombia, the Political Constitution defines it as both a right and a mandatory duty.” 

A recently published article explores the historical challenges in negotiating with the ELN. You may read it here: The ELN, a guerrilla group resistant to negotiation. 

The key, as emphasized by expert Sánchez Giraldo, is to remove weapons from political discussions—both those of the attackers and those of the State. Only after this step can negotiations move forward. 

“Academia must play a role in peacebuilding through research, advocacy, and engagement in the territories. Its participation in dialogue and negotiation processes is not just important—it represents an ethical imperative that we must uphold,” said the director of the Special Peace Unit. 

These contributions encompass academic research on violence and armed conflict, alongside active support from universities for peace processes. Teams of faculty and students offer academic and technological assistance, aid in reintegration and economic recovery projects, and help train demobilized combatants and local communities. The Special Peace Unit at the Universidad de Antioquia coordinates these initiatives. 

The director of the Institute of Political Studies emphasized the increasing involvement of the country’s universities in dialogue processes and the implementation of agreements. Notably, the Universidad de Antioquia and the National University have significantly contributed to the 2016 agreement between the government and the FARC. 

“We’re tackling one of the nation’s most pressing issues, and the university holds a vital responsibility due to its substantial potential to shape the discussion, influence agendas, and drive solution initiatives,” stressed Max Yuri Gil. 

“The dynamics of violence in Colombia have shifted, with rapid changes in recent years, complicating both the reality of war and the pursuit of peace,” stated Juan Correa Mejía, director of the Special Peace Unit at UdeA. 

Some conditions for achieving a consolidated peace 

The national government is leading several parallel negotiations as part of its broader effort to achieve what it defines as comprehensive peace. Photo: Office of the Peace Commissioner.  
 
Reports and analyses from government bodies, civil society, armed groups, think tanks, and international organizations highlight key elements that could help establish lasting peace in Colombia—beyond the fulfillment of agreements reached the negotiating table. 

Key elements include: 

• Implement justice mechanisms that fully guarantee victims’ rights to truth, reparation, and non-repetition, with clear accountability from those responsible. 

• Strengthen the State’s comprehensive presence—beyond military force—throughout the country. 

• Ensure inclusive political participation for demobilized combatants and the communities most affected by the conflict, nationally and locally.